Tertiary Copyright Liability
Benjamin H. Glatsteint
Napster, a computer program that allowed users to freely trade
copyrighted music, at one point enabled more than 165 million unauthorized song transfers a day.! Various copyright holders sought, and
were granted, an injunction against Napster, Inc., for contributory infringement.' Following Napster's legal battles, unsatisfied copyright
holders have turned again to the courts, seeking copyright infringement damages against tertiary parties that helped finance Napsteri
This attempt to impose liability on tertiary parties has been described
by some as commonplace, and by others as unprecedented.
Direct liability for copyright infringement occurs when one violates a right vested in the copyright owner.' Secondary liability arises
when another party either helps or is responsible for the directly infringing act or the directly infringing actor. Tertiary liability reaches
parties that assist a secondary party, but maintain no relationship with
the primary party. This Comment examines the viability of a theory of
tertiary copyright liability-an action against those who help the
helper-under the Copyright Act.' In this Comment, I argue that tertiary copyright liability is permissible under current indirect copyright
liability doctrines. There is little explicit statutory basis for tertiary liability, or for indirect liability generally. However, a system of tertiary
liability grounded in knowledge of direct infringement and assistance
t

B.A. 2002, Pomona College; J.D. Candidate 2005,The University of Chicago.
Roger Parloff, Killer App, Fortune 111, 112 (Sept 1, 2003). For a general introduction to
the history of Napster, Inc., and its legal woes, see id.
2
See A&M Records, Inc v Napster,Inc, 114 F Supp 2d 896 (ND Cal 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction to copyright holders), affd in part and revd in part, 239 F3d 1004 (9th Cir
2001) (affirming the lower court injunction with limited modifications). Hereinafter, except
where necessary to differentiate between the two, I will use "Napster" to refer to both Napster,
Inc., the corporation, and Napster, the computer program that facilitates song transfers.
3 See Part I.C.
4 See Joseph Menn, Defunct Napster's Saga Back in Court, LA Times C1 (Apr 28, 2004)
(reporting that Universal Music Group, suing Napster's financial backers, alleged that they
should be held liable on the basis that they effectively controlled Napster's activities). A press release from defendant Bertelsmann AG said that the tertiary liability suit was a "groundless and
cynical effort" to recover from Bertelsmann's "deep pockets," and that U.S. copyright law does
not extend to third-party lenders. Bertelsmann Seeks Dismissal of Copyright Infringement Lawsuits (July 17, 2003), online at http://www.bertelsmann.de/documents/en/Motion-todismiss.pdf
(visited July 24, 2004).
5 17 USC § 501(a) (2000) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.").
6
The Copyright Act is codified at 17 USC § 101 et seq (2000).
I

1605

1606

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:1605

to any infringer, or in a financial interest in the direct infringement
and control over any infringer, is both economically efficient and in
line with established precedent. Though the concept of tertiary liability may increase the risk of liability for parties far removed from the
actual infringement, limiting principles exist to isolate nominally tertiary parties for whom the extension of liability would cause inefficient
monitoring or undesirable decreases in investment.
Part I of this Comment provides a basic overview of indirect
copyright liability, including tertiary liability. Part II provides the theoretical basis for extending or contracting liability as a general matter,
with guidance from the Copyright Act. Part III argues that various
principles supporting indirect liability are compelling when applied to
tertiary infringers. Part III concludes by recommending tertiary liability rules that minimize the harms from, and maximize the benefits of,
the imposition of liability on tertiary infringers. Finally, Part IV discusses how parties would behave in a world where tertiary liability is
in effect.
I. INDIRECT LIABILITY
Current copyright infringement law extends liability beyond the
direct infringer. The doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability,
discussed in Part I.A, are the two primary theories by which secondary
infringers are held accountable. After examining how copyright liability can extend to some indirect parties, this Comment then assesses
the breadth of these theories. First, Part I.B discusses the definition for
a theoretical cause of action against tertiary parties. Next, Parts I.C
and I.D examine cases in which tertiary liability has been rejected and
accepted, respectively.
Contributory and Vicarious Liability

A.

The Copyright Act vests copyright owners with the exclusive
right to reproduce, distribute, perform, display, and prepare derivative
works of their copyrighted materials,' but no specific statutory basis
exists for the extension of copyright liability beyond a direct infringer. 8
7

17 USC § 106.

8 See Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios; Inc, 464 US 417, 434 (1984) ("The
Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another."). Some courts point to the statutory grant in 17 USC § 106 of the power "to authorize"
production and distribution of the copyrighted work as a basis for the extension of liability. See
Subafilms; Ltd v MGM-Pathe Communications Co, 24 F3d 1088,1093 (9th Cir 1994) (finding that
"the addition of the words 'to authorize' in the 1976 [Copyright] Act appears best understood as
merely clarifying that the Act contemplates liability for contributory infringement"). See also
Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright:A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical, and Artistic Property, and the Protection of Ideas § 12.04[A][3][a] at 12-90 n 81
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The Supreme Court has emphasized that the ultimate goal of copyright law is to serve the public interest; the creator's moral rights do
not factor into the legal calculus.9 Compensation, in turn, is the principal means of stimulating the creation of works for the eventual en-

richment of the public domain; interpretation of ambiguous statutory
passages must remain true to this goal.'
Only the copyright holder may authorize another to exercise any
of the exclusive rights provided by the Copyright Act, and any person
who violates any of the exclusive rights is infringing the copyright."
In contrast, patent law, which has been considered a scientific analog

to copyright, 2 explicitly provides for indirect liability." Nevertheless,
copyright law has long extended to "indirect"'4 or "secondary" copy-

right infringers, who may be liable for copyright violations even
though another party is directly violating the copyright. 5 Indirect liability under copyright law is broken down into contributory and vicarious liability."

(Matthew Bender 2003) ("'[T]o authorize' is simply a convenient peg on which Congress chose
to hang the antecedent jurisprudence of third party liability.").
9 See Fox Film Corp v Doyal, 286 US 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors."). See also US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8 (authorizing Congress
to create patent and copyright protection for limited times to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts").
10 See Feist Publicationsv Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc, 499 US 340, 349 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress
of Science and Useful Arts."'), quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. See also Twentieth Century Music Corp v Aiken, 422 US 151, 156 (1975) ("When technological change has rendered its literal
terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.").
11 17 USC § 106.
12 See Sony, 464 US at 439 ("The closest analogy [to vicarious liability for copyright infringement] is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of the
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.").
13 35 USC § 271(b) (2000) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.").
14
For the most part, the terms "indirect" and "secondary" are interchangeable. However,
when considering that there are potentially different types of indirect infringers, such as secondary, tertiary, or quaternary, the vocabulary must be refined. In this Comment, "indirect infringer" refers to any infringer that is not a direct infringer, including a secondary or tertiary
offender.
15 See Sony, 464 US at 435 (finding liability for contributory copyright infringement despite the absence of express language creating such liability in the copyright statute). See also
Broadcast Music, Inc v 3-B, Inc, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 5679, *9 (ED Mich) (holding a restaurant
owner liable for the unauthorized public performances of copyrighted compositions by an employee disc jockey).
16
Although the doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability have different tests and rationales, no strict dichotomy exists between them; the doctrines have significant overlap, as a
secondary infringer could often conceivably be either vicarious or contributory in its infringement. See Sony, 464 US at 435 n 17 ("[T]he lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn."), quoting Universal City Studios, Inc v
Sony Corp of America, 480 F Supp 429,457-58 (CD Cal 1979).
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1. Contributory liability.

Contributory liability focuses on the relationship between a secondary party and an infringer,7 and similar to the patent analog, is
premised on the concept that courts must at times look behind actual
duplication or infringement and attach liability "to the products or activities that make such duplication possible."" Contributory liability
may attach where a party knowingly induces, causes, or materially
contributes to another's infringing conduct." Thus, the two-part test

for contributory copyright liability looks to knowledge and then to action. The action could consist of providing means to infringe,' ° engaging in conduct that furthers the infringement," or encouraging an infringer's activity."
Contributory liability originates in the tort law concept that one
who materially contributes to another's tort should be held accountable." Simply, this is the copyright analog to the familiar concept of
joint and several liability for those who further tortious acts," and it is
also sometimes described as an "outgrowth of enterprise liability."
17 See Paul Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 6.0 at 6:4-1 (Aspen 2d ed 2003) ("[I]f the defendant
was implicated in the acts constituting the direct infringement, courts will hold it liable for contributory infringement.").
18 Sony, 464 US at 442.
19 See Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management, Inc, 443 F2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir 1971). See also Sony, 464 US at 437 (noting that it is "just" to impose contributory liability where the party "was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had
authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner"). This formulation is derived
from Kalem Co v Harper Brothers, 222 US 55 (1911) (holding a producer of an unauthorized
film version of Ben Hur liable for the sale of the film to wholesalers, who in turn commercialized
the product). See also Adobe Systems Inc v Canus Productions,Inc, 173 F Supp 2d 1044,1054-55
(CD Cat 2001) (discussing the defendant's ability to police users and discover infringers).
20
See, for example, Sony, 464 US at 436-38 (discussing the requirements for imposing contributory liability on those who supply the "means" for infringing copyright).
21 See Matthew Bender & Co, Inc v West Publishing Co, 158 F3d 693, 706 (2d Cir 1998)
(stating that a court may find contributory liability when there is "personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement").
22
See, for example, Cable/Home Communication Corp v Network Productions,Inc, 902
F2d 829,851 (11th Cir 1990) (noting that the defendants "openly publicized and encouraged" the
purchase of a device that allowed direct users to decode cable television signals). Compare Sony,
464 US at 438 (noting that Sony had not "influenced or encouraged" unauthorized copying).
23
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Persons Acting in Concert) § 876 (1979):

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.
This contains an explicit caveat restricting the opinion of the Restatement to situations where intent is present. Id, Caveat to § 876. See also id § 875 (noting that contributing tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable).
24
See Neil Boorstyn, 1 Boorstyn on Copyright § 10.06[2] at 10-36.1 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 2d ed 1994).
25 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04[A][2] at 12-79 (cited in note 8) (stating that contributory
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Even if a plaintiff demonstrates both knowledge and action by
the defendant, there are affirmative defenses to contributory liability,

principally the substantial noninfringing use test.26 That defense, similar to the "staple article of commerce" element of indirect patent infringement, limits liability for potentially infringing products." The operation of tertiary liability, as advocated in this Comment, should not
undermine these defenses.

2. Vicarious liability.
Vicarious copyright infringement hinges on the relationship between direct and indirect infringers. Vicarious liability, a concept also
found elsewhere in the law,29 involves holding one person accountable

for the actions of another. ° Courts impose vicarious liability when a
party has a "right and ability to supervise" the directly liable party as

infringement law is "an outgrowth of the tort concept of enterprise liability"), citing Demetriades
v Kaufmann, 690 F Supp 289,292 (SD NY 1988).
26 See Sony, 464 US at 442 ("Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of
other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses."). Other doctrines, such as the fair use doctrine, excuse direct infringements
and will not apply to indirect infringements. See 17 USC § 107 (listing factors for courts to consider when determining fair use). There are other statutory defenses that are less commonly
asserted, including an agricultural fair exception, 17 USC § 110(6), a passive carrier exception,
17 USC § 111(a), and a library exemption, 17 USC § 108. Copyright liability defenses generally
may be explained by the distinction between economic substitutes, which lower demand for the
copyrighted work, and complements, which increase demand for the work. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.3 at 43 (Aspen 6th ed 2003) ("A favorable book review is a
complement of the book reviewed ... ; the video recorder and the public performance are both
complements and substitutes. Which effect is dominant will determine whether copyright holders
will gain or lose from the invocation of the fair use privilege.").
27 See Sony, 464 US at 440-42 (comparing the substantial noninfringing test to the staple
article of commerce doctrine in patent law).
28
See generally Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 6.0 at 6:4-1 (cited in note 17):
[Whereas] a defendant will be liable for contributory infringement if it knew of, and contributed to, the direct infringement even though it could not control and had no financial
interest in the acts of infringement ... [a] defendant will be vicariously liable if it could control and had a financial interest in the infringement even though it did not know of it or
contribute directly to it.
29 See, for example, W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts § 72 at
516 (West 5th ed 1984) ("In a partnership, there is a more or less permanent business arrangement, creating a mutual agency between the partners for the purpose of carrying on some general business, so that the acts of one are to be charged against another."); Heick v Bacon, 561
NW2d 45, 50-51 (Iowa 1997) (limiting joint enterprise liability between driver and passenger to
situations where the passenger and driver have a joint right of control over the car, which requires that they share a common pecuniary interest in the objective of the journey).
30 See Sony, 464 US at 435 ("[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law,
and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another.").
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well as an "obvious and direct financial interest" in permitting ongo-

ing acts of infringement.3
Vicarious liability is concerned with penalizing those who reap
the benefits of another's illegal behavior," with or without actual
knowledge that the other is engaging in unlawful conduct." This functions to shift liability from individuals to enterprises, Mthereby capturing situations in which one party benefits from the infringing actions
of another, internalizing the costs of the entire operation. 5
What Is Tertiary Liability?

B.

Tertiary copyright liability captures situations in which a party
has a relationship with a secondary infringer or with an act of secondary infringement. In secondary copyright liability, the courts examine
the relationship of the secondary party with the direct infringer (vicarious liability) or with the act of direct infringement (contributory
liability). Tertiary liability operates in much the same way. A tertiary
vicarious infringer is one who maintains a relationship with a secondary infringer (tertiary vicarious liability) or a secondary act of infringement (tertiary contributory liability), but not with the direct
infringer.
Tertiary liability's distinguishing feature is that while the tertiary
party interacts with the secondary party, the tertiary party has no relationship with the direct infringer. If there is a relationship between the
tertiary party and the directly infringing party (or infringing act), then
the "tertiary party" is simply a secondary infringer. Thus, there may be
ten secondary infringers, but no tertiary infringers. For example, each
The original articulation of this test is found in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co, Inc v H.L.
Green Co, Inc, 316 F2d 304, 307 (2d Cir 1963). See also, for example, Pinkham v Sara Lee Corp,
983 F2d 824, 834 (8th Cir 1992) (articulating the same test). The meaning of "right and ability to
supervise" and "financial interest" is discussed in greater depth in Part III.D.
32
See Artists Music, Inc v Reed Publishing (USA), Inc, 31 USPQ2d 1623, 1626 (SD NY
1994) ("The purpose of imposing vicarious liability is to punish one who unfairly reaps the benefits of another's infringing behavior.").
33
See Fonovisa,Inc v Cherry Auction, Inc, 76 F3d 259, 265 (9th Cir 1996) (stating that actual knowledge is not required).
34 Keeton, et al, Prosserand Keeton on Torts § 69 at 500 (cited in note 29):
31

The losses caused by the torts of employees ... are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a
required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having enit is just that [the employer], rather than the innocent injured
gaged in an enterprise ....
plaintiff, should bear [the costs].
See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum L Rev 343,348 (1947) (discussing enterprise liability).
35
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability,and the First Amendment, 88 Georgetown L J 1833, 1858 (2000) ("Vicarious
liability in tort, like its namesake in copyright, constitutes a form of enterprise liability that holds
the defendant liable for the behavior of another.").
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of ten secondary infringers can give a key piece of recording equipment to a direct infringer, thereby enabling the direct infringement.?
Likewise, tertiary liability does not turn on the proximity in an
institution's hierarchy between a direct infringer and an indirect
infringer. Vicarious liability has the potential to trace all the way up

the chain of management. The chief executive officer of a company
may be vicariously liable for the direct infringement of a low-level
employee, even if there are many levels of middle management be-

tween them. The CEO is not a tertiary infringer even though the liability traces through a variety of intermediaries. A tertiary vicarious
infringer is liable through the acts of a secondary infringer rather than
a direct infringer, whereas the liability of the CEO is based on her re-

lationship with a direct infringer. It is worth noting that parties need
not pierce the corporate veil under a theory of tertiary vicarious liability to reach management or certain shareholders, giving vicarious liability a potentially broad reach. 7

An action based on an indirect liability claim requires an alleged
act of direct infringement.8 Courts require an alleged act of direct infringement to ensure that there is actually some harm to the copyright
holder. Put another way, tertiary liability, like secondary liability, is not
an inchoate crime, but requires some consummating act that harms
the copyright holder.

C. Opinions Rejecting Tertiary Liability-The Napster Decision
In 1999, Napster created a computer program that allowed users

to trade copyrighted music over the internet without permission from,
or compensation for, copyright owners. 4 Following the music indus36 The fact that there are multiple secondary infringers is irrelevant to the question of
whether there are any tertiary offenders. Conversely, there could be many tertiary offenders but
only one secondary offender. Each of fifteen tertiary parties could give a key piece of equipment
to a single secondary party.
37 See, for example, United States Media Corp v Edde Entertainment Corp, 1998 US Dist
LEXIS 10985, *23 (SD NY) (noting that a "corporate officer or principal shareholder may be
held responsible for the corporation's copyright infringement" as either a contributory or vicarious infringer); Greaver v National Association of Corporate Directors, 1995 US Dist LEXIS
21816, *14 n 11 (D DC) ("Company officials and shareholders can be held liable for copyright
infringement if they are in a position to police the 'primary infringer' and had a direct financial
interest.");Jobete Music Co, Inc v Media Broadcasting Corp, 713 F Supp 174,178 (MD NC 1988)
("[Clases have also determined that shareholders may be held jointly and severally liable for
copyright infringement under the right and ability/interest test.").
38 However, no court has explicitly decided whether an action may lie when there is no direct infringement. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04[A][3][a] at 12-91 (cited in note 8) (concluding that "the rule should generally prevail that third party liability, as its name implies, may
exist only when direct liability, i.e., infringement, is present").
39 This differentiates indirect liability in copyright from inchoate indirect liability crimes
such as conspiracy.
40 For a brief discussion of the history of Napster and its legal battles, see Paul Goldstein,
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try's successful suit against Napster," some copyright holders brought

suit against Napster's financial backers, including the venture capital
firm Hummer Winblad and some of Napster's more outspoken sup'3
porters.4z The suit did not allege that Napster was a direct infringer,
nor did it explicitly allege that Napster itself was in direct violation of
the Copyright Act.
Resolving the case on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the court found no merit in either the contributory or the vicarious liability theories offered by the plaintiffs. First, the court found "no
support" for the legal proposition that those who aid a contributory
offender may be liable as contributory or vicarious infringers themselves. 4" Specifically, the court dismissed the claim for lack of alleged
"substantial participation in a specific act of direct infringement.'
The court then turned to the allegations of vicarious copyright infringement and found dispositive the lack of an allegation of a right

4
and ability to supervise the directly infringing activity. The court refused to establish liability without a connection to a direct act. It further concluded that intent to profit from the investment in the contributory infringer was insufficient to satisfy the direct financial inter-

est requirement.

Opinions Extending Liability to Tertiary Parties
While the Napster court rejected the tertiary theory of liability,
other copyright cases provide support for the extension of copyright
liability to tertiary parties, if only by implication. Indeed, the seminal

D.

contributory copyright liability case, Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management,Inc,"' implies that the degree of separation
Copyright'sHighway: From Gutenberg to the CelestialJukebox 165-69 (Stanford 2003).
See A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc, 284 F3d 1091 (9th Cir 2001) (affirming the modi41
fied injunction issued against Napster).
See In re Napster,Inc Copyright Litigation, No C 00-1369 (MHP), No C 00-4725 (MHP),
42
slip op at 4-7 (ND Cal July 9,2001) (listing defendants and the claims brought against them).
43 Id at 3 (stating that, according to the plaintiffs allegations, "Napster users are the direct infringers, Napster is the secondary infringer and the individual defendants are tertiary infringers").
44 Napster, No C 00-4725 (MHP), slip op at 3.
45 Id at 3-4. Read carefully, however, the legal authority adduced for this proposition does
not support it. For example, the court cites Cable/Home Communication Corp, 902 F2d at 845,
for the statement that "[c]ontributory infringement must follow a finding of direct or primary infringement." That is accurate; however, it does not follow that third-order parties cannot also be
contributory infringers following a finding of direct infringement.
46 Napster, No C 00-4725 (MHP), slip op at 6 ("[Plaintiff] does not allege that any of these
defendants have the right or ability to supervise or control the infringing activity.").
47 Id ("Although the complaint alleges that these defendants 'intend to profit' from use of
the Napster system, [plaintiff] does not assert that they have a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.").
48 443 F2d 1159 (2d Cir 1971). This case is seminal in that its language and reasoning have
been widely adopted. It is cited by major treatises and hundreds of cases, including Supreme
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between primary infringers and liable parties is not a material factor
in the analysis. 9
In Gershwin, Columbia Artists Management operated a division
dedicated to establishing and nurturing local nonprofit organizations.o
Those organizations, in turn, organized concerts, the proceeds of which
were used to reimburse Columbia for advertising and other expenses,
and to pay the artist a performance fee, from which Columbia deducted its commission." In this situation, the musical performers were
direct infringers (violating the copyright holder's exclusive right to
perform publicly), and the local nonprofit groups were contributory
infringers because they helped organize the infringing performances.
The court concluded that Columbia's "pervasive participation in the
formation and direction of [the local nonprofit groups] and its programming of compositions" was sufficient to sustain liability. 2 The
court applied the common law doctrine that one who knowingly "furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tortfeasor." 3 Without explicitly noting so, the court endorsed a theory of
tertiary liability: liability extended (1) on the basis of a relationship
with a secondary infringer, and (2) while lacking a relationship with
the direct infringer.!
More recent cases provide similar support for tertiary liability. In
Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc," Netcom, an internet service provider (ISP), provided internet access to a bulletin board system (BBS). The BBS, in turn, allowed

Court cases. See, for example, Sony, 464 US at 438 n 18.
49 Gershwin,443 F2d at 1163 (emphasis added):
Although [Columbia Artists Management] had no formal power to control either the local
association [that is, the secondary infringer] or the artists for whom it served as agents [that
is, the direct infringers] it is clear that the local association depended on [Columbia] for direction in matters such as this, that [Columbia] was in a position to police the infringing
conduct of its artists, and that it derived substantial financial benefit from the actions of the
primary infringers.
The language here relies on Columbia's relationship with the artists, the direct infringers, and the
local organization, the secondary infringer.
50
Id at 1160-61.
51 Id at 1161. For a more detailed explanation of the facts, see Gershwin Publishing Corp v
ColumbiaArtists Management,Inc, 312 F Supp 581,581-82 (SD NY 1970), affd, 443 F2d 1159.
52
Gershwin, 443 F2d at 1163 ("[Columbia] knew that copyrighted works were being performed ... and that neither the local association [contributory infringer as well] nor the performing artists [primary infringers] would secure a copyright license. It was, therefore, responsible for
[and vicariously liable for] the infringement of those primary infringers.").
53 Idat 1162.
54 It is possible to distinguish Gershwin from "pure" tertiary liability because Columbia received money directly from the artists (and therefore benefited from the direct infringement as
well as from the secondary infringement). Nevertheless, it appears that the court was willing to
extend liability to Columbia because of its control over the local nonprofits. See id at 1163.
55 907 F Supp 1361 (ND Cal 1995).
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one of its subscribers to post material that infringed the plaintiff's
copyright. In this scenario, an individual BBS user was the direct infringer. The BBS was a contributory infringer since it provided the
means for publishing the copyrighted material. Netcom was a tertiary
offender because it aided the BBS, the secondary offender. In considering the issue of Netcom's liability for contributory infringement, the
court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to both
direct infringement.6
Netcom's knowledge of and participation in the
In sum, it appears that copyright liability can extend to tertiary
parties on the basis of their relationship with a secondary rather than
a direct infringer. None of the examples of tertiary liability offered
here is as clean cut as that of Napster's backers, where there was no
possibility that the tertiary parties could have interacted with the direct infringers; however, at least some courts have recast tertiary infringement as second-order infringement, avoiding the nomenclature
but not the substantive result."

II.

SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE TERTIARY
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT?

The mere potential for recognizing a theory of tertiary liability
gives courts little guidance when determining whether the doctrine
should exist and when liability should be extended beyond direct or
secondary infringers. Part II.A concludes that the text of the Copyright Act does not explicitly preclude, and may implicitly endorse, tertiary liability. Part II.B finds that a number of other considerations
support the extension of copyright liability to tertiary parties. Part II.C
then discusses the strong concerns militating against extending liability too broadly.
56 The court concluded that the facts would not sustain a claim of vicarious liability. The
court noted that Netcom still had the right to control, despite the fact that the direct infringer
only had a relationship with the BBS, not with Netcom:
In this case Netcom is even further removed from [the direct infringer's] activities... However, it is not crucial that [the direct infringer] does not obtain access directly through Netcorn. The issue is Netcom's right and ability to control the use of its system, which it can do
indirectly by controlling [the secondary infringer's] use.

Id at 1375 n 22. However, the court found that Netcom reaped no financial benefit despite the
plaintiffs' contention that Netcom's policy of allowing infringing material on its network attracted infringers, resulting in an indirect financial benefit. Id at 1377. Although the financial interest test was not satisfied here, given the breadth of the test, it is not inconceivable that other
courts could have reached differing conclusions on this point. With respect to ISPs, this discussion is largely mooted by the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See Part II.A.2.
There are several possible reasons for this. First, adopting a vocabulary which includes
57
"tertiary" or "third-order" offenders may seem to broaden the tort too far. Tertiary language is
difficult to pare back; it may be easier to maintain that all liability is "secondary" while still holding tertiary parties accountable in order to decrease uncertainty and potential litigation. Second,
tertiary liability is not explicitly endorsed by the Copyright Act or by any court.
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A. The Copyright Act's Infringement Provisions
1. Plain text of the Copyright Act.

Section 106 of the Copyright Act vests certain rights exclusively
in the copyright holder.- This section also gives the copyright holder
the exclusive right "to authorize" the exercise of any of these vested
rights.'9 Thus, only the copyright holder can authorize the public staging of a play she has written. Section 501(a) is the statutory basis for
an infringement action.' ° This clause indicates that a person who au-

thorizes another party to violate an exclusive right-for example, by
authorizing a public performance-is an infringer. No distinction is
made as to the manner in which the right is violated.
Since § 106 vests in the copyright holder the exclusive right of authorization, this seems to indicate that secondary infringement would
be a type of infringement contemplated by the Act. Moreover, § 106
does not differentiate between liability for violating a "to do" right,
such as publicly performing or reproducing the work, which would
create direct liability, versus a "to authorize" right; hence it too offers
support for indirect liability. Finally, § 501(b) provides that the copy-

right owner may "institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it."6' This reference to "any infringement" again indicates that direct and indirect acts
of infringement must be treated identically; thus, an "authorizer" is an
infringer. Therefore, the party authorizing the authorizer is also an infringer, and so on. To some extent, this approach is reinforced by the
interpretation the Supreme Court has given the statute, also equating
"authorizers" with standard infringers.a
With this reading, the text of the Copyright Act supports third-,
fourth-, and fifth-order copyright liability if one authorizes an infringement. The Napster court, however, rejected this theory as lacking
a legal basis. As far as the Copyright Act is concerned, this reading
17 USC § 106(1)-(6).
17 USC § 106.
17 USC § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided in sections 106 through 122 ... is an infringer of copyright or the right of
the
author, as the case may be.").
61 17 USC § 501(b) (emphasis added).
62 The Supreme Court seems to embrace the more expansive definition
of infringement,
stating that "anyone who trespasses into [the copyright holder's] exclusive domain by using
or
authorizing the use of the copyrighted work ... is an infringer of the copyright." Sony Corp
of
America v Universal City Studios; Inc, 464 US 417,433 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). Again, the fact that the Court considered both Sony (the manufacturer) and
its advertising agency collectively indicates that degrees of liability are not material. See id
at
422.
63 In re Napster,Inc Copyright Litigation, No C 00-1369 (MHP), No C
00-4725 (MHP), slip
op at 3 (ND Cal July 9, 2001) ("[L]iability for contributory infringement requires substantial par58

59
60
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seems unduly narrow; the plain language of the statute can certainly
be read to permit liability for tertiary parties whose actions "authorize" infringement.' On the other hand, it is clear that the Copyright
Act does not mandate tertiary liability; one might conclude that the
textual support for even secondary liability is lukewarm at best. Still, if
one accepts the conclusion that the Copyright Act authorizes secondary liability, the same textual reading should support tertiary liability
as well.

2. Exclusio unius: internet service provider safe harbor.
Following Netcom, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act" (DMCA), portions of which include a safe harbor

provision for ISPs. 6 Essentially, this section of the DMCA was de-

signed to prevent tertiary liability from extending to unintentionally

infringing ISPs. The fact that Congress did not simply amend the
Copyright Act itself to remove all possibility of tertiary liability may,

by negative inference, indicate implicit authorization for courts to continue extending tertiary liability, except in areas explicitly removed

from their jurisdiction. 6'
On the other hand, it is not clear that Congress, when amending
the Copyright Act, thought that it was acknowledging a limitation to
tertiary liability, rather than secondary liability. Further, the exclusio
unius argument relies on congressional silence-not a strong foundation for extending liability.6 Nevertheless, even if Congress did not intend to create, recognize, or limit a new category of liability, by recog-

ticipation in a specific act of direct infringement.") (internal citation omitted).
64 On the other hand, the Supreme Court's Sony decision gave little guidance to courts
struggling to define the limits of indirect liability. In Sony, the Court stated that the judiciary is
"reluctan[t] to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance," and that "Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations" that new technology allows. 464 US at 431. Nevertheless,
the Court stated that "the absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements." Id.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998), codified in
65
various sections of titles 17 and 28 (2000).
Copy66 See 17 USC § 512 ("Limitations on liability relating to material online"); WIPO
HR
Limitation,
Liability
Infringement
Copyright
On-Line
and
right Treaties Implementation
Rep No 105-551(1), 105th Cong, 2d Sess 11 (1998) (identifying the provision as codifying the result in Netcom, describing it as "the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date").
67 This would be an example of exclusio unius est inclusio alterius-theexception made for
one implies applicability to all others. See, for example, New York v 11 Cornwell Co, 718 F2d 22,
24 n 1 (2d Cir 1983) (discussing the exclusio unius canon of construction).
a "venture
68 Indeed, to interpret congressional silence is, as Justice Frankfurter noted,
C.
into speculative unrealities." Helvering v Hallock, 309 US 106, 120 (1940). See also John
"Speculative
into
Venture
A
Intent.
Legislative
for
Search
the
and
Silence
Grabow, Congressional
Unrealities;" 64 BU L Rev 737 (1984) (arguing generally that reliance on congressional silence is
inappropriate).
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nizing an exception to this category it arguably gave implicit en-

dorsement to the doctrine.
B.

Reasons to Extend Copyright Liability to Tertiary Parties

A variety of efficiency justifications exist for further extension of

liability, as discussed in Part II.B.1. Tertiary liability gives the lowest-

cost avoider an incentive to monitor and deter infringing activity.
It also helps solve a collective action problem inherent in direct and

secondary infringement actions. Part II.B.2 argues that if courts are
extending tertiary liability already (and it appears that they are), it
would be best for them to admit doing so and begin to draw clear

boundaries to reduce uncertainty and risk.

1. Extending liability to tertiary parties yields efficiency gains.

Extending liability to tertiary parties is efficient for several reasons. 9 Principally, tertiary liability encourages efficient precautions by
placing the burden to monitor and prevent infringement on the low-

est-cost avoider. Indirect liability also aids copyright owners seeking
appropriate compensation for infringing activity, and thereby helps
prevent a public goods problem.
a) Incentives for efficient precautions. If the gains to the copy-

right holder from marginal avoidance of copyright infringement outweigh the costs to the third party-as measured by the costs of additional monitoring and deterrence measures-it makes sense to give
the third party incentives to act.' The legal rule should ideally minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and precautions as if all parties

were under common control." In turn, this prevention will be efficient

69
A variety of efficiency justifications for indirect liability generally also apply to tertiary
liability, although with less force. I focus here on those rationales that present a stronger case for
extending liability beyond secondary parties. For example, actions against indirect parties are often preferable for copyright holders because they allow the copyright holder to reduce total infringement in just one legal action. Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of
DigitalDistribution,47 Antitrust Bull 423, 442 (2002) ("Chasing individual consumers is time
consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem."). This same result may hold for tertiary liability, but it is not clear that the gain to copyright holders over that which secondary liability already offers would be substantial.
70
The outcome described above is an application of Judge Learned Hand's famous
formula: extend liability when B, the cost of the precaution, is less than P, the probability of the
occurrence, multiplied by L, the magnitude of the injury. United States v Carroll Towing Co,
159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947). Technically, Hand's formula did not rely on marginal costs and
benefits, but nevertheless it is close to the negligence rule that encourages efficient levels of
precaution.
71 Id. See also John Prather Brown, "Learned Hand rule," in Peter Newman, ed,
2 The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 514, 515 (Macmillan 1998) ("Efficient levels of
precaution are those levels of precautions by both injurer and victim which would be taken if
both the injurer and the victim were under common control and the level of precautions were

1618

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:1605

if the lowest-cost avoider is given incentives to act (or not act), and
the benefits of acting outweigh the costs." Simply put, if massive infringement is inexpensive to prevent by extending liability to indirect
parties, it makes sense to extend liability.
From this perspective, extending liability to tertiary parties will
often encourage cost-effective precautions. Active investors, such as
venture capital firms, or those who license key technologies, are often
the lowest-cost avoiders for preventing contributory infringement.
Rather than attempt to shut down every contributory infringer-of
which there may be many,73 each requiring an expensive legal battleit may be better to place liability on those who enable the contribu-

tory infringers, thereby discouraging the infringement in the first
place. The tertiary party is in the lowest-cost position to ensure that

small, seedling secondary infringers do not grow into large infringers
because of capital investments or technological acquisitions. With tertiary liability, investors have an incentive not to make an investment
that would greatly increase overall infringement.

In many situations, the most cost-effective option for avoiding infringement will be one of design: could Sony have shipped VCRs that

were incapable of recording?" In the context of tertiary liability, the

question becomes whether a tertiary party was in the best position to

effect cost-justified changes. Napster's active investors might have en-

sured that steps were taken to protect against the transmission of
copyrighted works; ISPs might have denied Napster service unless it

developed technologies to slow copying; an inventor with a certain

technology may be in a good position to effect some product design

changes that quickly and cheaply decrease infringement, or to withhold the technology until such changes are made. Tertiary parties that
act as enablers are especially good candidates to incentivize. If the

secondary infringers would not exist without the tertiary parties-or
taken to minimize overall costs of accidents and precautions taken together.").
the burden
72 Normative law and economics literature encourages legal results that place
MautMenachem
cost.
lowest
the
at
result
the
of preventing harm on the party able to prevent
ReInvolving
Conflicts
in
Priorities
of
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Eternal
ner, "The
to
rules,
tort
that
agree
economists
legal
that
mote Parties,90 Mich L Rev 95, 101 (1991) (noting
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been
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would
costs
avoidance
his
"if
party
a
on
liability
impose
should
efficient,
be
than the accident's expected losses").
73 There are a variety of computer programs that are arguably contributory infringers. For
Code, Soa discussion of some of the different systems, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic
Rev 505,
L
Va
89
Networks,
File-Swapping
the
on
Cooperation
of
Emergence
the
and
cial Norms;
511-22 (2003) (describing different file-swapping programs).
74 Some have argued that in a negligence regime indirect liability would be preferable to
for
the Sony test. See, for example, Douglas Lichtman and William Landes, Indirect Liability
("[Ain ef(2003)
395,405
Tech
&
L
J
Harv
16
Perspective,
Economic
Infringement:An
Copyright
activity that
ficient approach to indirect liability might start by applying a negligence rule to any
can lead to copyright infringement.").
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would not exist on the same scale-it makes sense to give the tertiary
parties incentives either to encourage noninfringing design or not to
invest at all. Exposing more parties to the costs of infringing will encourage those parties to take cost-justified measures to prevent infringement or to internalize the costs of their operation." That is, limited liability makes many secondary infringers judgment-proof, and
thus they will not internalize the cost of their operations. Constraining
liability to secondary infringers alone leaves nonconsensual creditors-that is, the copyright holders-holding the bag. Better to extend

liability to tertiary parties who, as contract creditors, can evaluate risk

and expected return ex ante, and therefore encourage cost-effective
deterrence.76
Changes in technology and responses to the current legal rules
will likely strengthen this argument. For example, secondary infringers,

reacting to the extension of liability in domestic courts, may choose to
move overseas. In situations like this, the lowest-cost avoider over
whom a plaintiff can obtain jurisdiction and encourage to prevent the

infringing may be the tertiary infringer.

b) Preventing a collective action problem. Legislatures may

want to encourage actions against indirect infringers because such
actions produce what economists term "public goods.""7 Although a
downloader may be illegally acquiring works by a variety of musicians,
any single musician who brings suit against the downloader will bear

the entire cost of the legal action and will not be able to internalize
the benefits flowing to all musicians. From the musician's perspective,
therefore, the private benefits may not outweigh the private costs,
while the public benefits do outweigh the private costs. Therefore, the
suit is a type of "public good" that will be underproduced if not
encouraged. 8

75 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L J
1231, 1244 (1984),
noting that employee insolvency leads to several inefficiencies:
First, potentially insolvent agents are likely to invest inefficiently little of their own
resources in the avoidance of wrongs... [S]econd[,] ... the possibility of agent insolvency
increases the expected profitability of the principal-agent enterprise.... Finally, when agents
are potentially insolvent, the perceived costs of production for each principal-agent enterprise understate the true economic costs of production.
76
See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,43 U Chi L
Rev 499,501-02 (1976) (discussing the creditor's role as risk assessor).
77 See Anthony De Jasay, "Prisoners' Dilemma and the Theory
of the State," in Peter
Newman, ed, 3 The New PalgraveDictionary of Economics and the Law, 95,99-101 (Macmillan
1998) (defining and distinguishing collective action problems from public goods). A public
good
is one whose use is nonrivalrous and nonexclusive. A suit against an infringer is nonrivalrous
because the benefits accruing to one artist whose copyrights are protected do not diminish
the
benefits accruing to another artist. It is nonexclusive because the benefits of the lawsuit
cannot
be internalized by one party.
78
See Lichtman and Landes, 16 Harv J L & Tech at 408 (cited in note 74) ("[I]t might well
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At first blush it is not obvious why tertiary liability would alleviate the problem, rather than just provide another type of suit that

would also be hampered by free riding. Note, however, that if all law-

suits are negative value suits, it will clearly not be in the interest of the
copyright holder to bring suit, even if it would be in the interest of all

musicians generally to prevent the infringement. Most suits against
secondary infringers will be negative value simply because these parties are likely judgment-proof start-up companies or otherwise inca-

pable of compensating the copyright holder. In these situations, secondary liability does not address the lack of incentive to go after secondary parties.

But, suits against tertiary parties may be more likely to seek-

and to obtain-damages. The further liability extends, the more likely
the copyright holder is to obtain compensation, that is, to have a posi-

tive value suit, and therefore overcome the collective action problem.

Indeed, theoretically, rather than a collective action problem, tertiary
liability may create a race to sue the tertiary party and collect whatever damages are available before resources are exhausted. Tertiary

liability, like any form of indirect liability that reaches "deep pockets,"

79
would encourage lawsuits. This same feature of tertiary liability
would alleviate the undercompensation problem that exists with respect to other means of excluding the copyright holders from effective

remedies, such as jurisdictional limitations' or judgment-proof finances" as well.

2. Courts are already extending copyright liability to
tertiary parties.

Courts are already imposing tertiary copyright liability, at least in

substantive result. It is preferable that courts also adopt the vocabu-

lary of tertiary infringement liability for several reasons. First, there
if the
improve efficiency to require that copyright holders go after services, not individuals, even
opposite strategy would be in the private interest of a given copyright holder.").
79 It is possible to argue, however, that indirect liability creates a free rider problem. Artist
X may choose to let Artist Y sue the indirect infringer. Artist X will benefit from the suit, but will
effibear none of the costs. Artist Y, therefore, has created a positive externality that it cannot
the
ciently internalize. While this is a free rider problem, it is not substantively different from
exacerliability
indirect
whether
is
question
The
liability.
direct
only
problem that existed with
for
bates the free rider problem. Because it makes some recovery possible-versus no potential
efficient.
be
balance,
on
will,
alone-it
liability
direct
with
recovery
is out80 See Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 6.0 at 6:5 (cited in note 17) ("If the direct infringer
the
represent
may
infringer
related
a
against
action
an
venue,
or
side the court's jurisdiction
copyright owner's most effective avenue for relief").
(A "rationale
81 See Lichtman and Landes, 16 Harv J L & Tech at 398 (cited in note 74)
[for vicarious copyright liability] is that liability helps to minimize the implications of bankrupt
the
infringers... Indirect liability solves this problem by putting the employer's resources on
line, thereby increasing the odds that the harm from infringement will be internalized.").
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are already several disagreements between courts as to when and how
to extend copyright liability. Further, the tests themselves are not well
defined. This is a worst-of-both-worlds problem: some actors may suspect that tertiary liability exists, but because no court has explicitly articulated the test through which it should operate, risk and uncertainty
abound.
The existence of tertiary liability raises the larger question of why
courts are adopting broader copyright infringement tests than have
been explicitly endorsed. This may be part of a larger trend toward
broadening intellectual property rights in general." It could also be a
reaction to legislative inaction. Faced with rampant copyright infringement, courts may be taking it upon themselves to devise rules
within the existing copyright law framework to efficiently curb copyright abuses. Changes in intellectual property rights may be explained
by examining societal changes that in turn alter the value of those
property rights.u That is, standard secondary copyright liability rules
may be too weak to adequately protect intellectual property rights
given the near-zero cost of copying, the ease of avoiding jurisdictional
limitations, and the oft-judgment-proof status of many technologically
adept infringers. In response to these trends, perhaps it is not surprising that courts have acted independently of legislatures to strengthen
property rights.
C. Arguments against Tertiary Liability
Although tertiary liability has some efficiency justifications, it is
necessary to explore the countervailing problems it may cause. Principally, increases in liability create greater investment risk, encourage
potentially wasteful behavior, raise risk premiums, and raise questions
about whether courts are capable of designing optimal liability regimes appropriate for fast-changing technologies.
1. Increased risk and attendant investment chill.
Investors are concerned not so much about rates of return as
about risk-adjusted rates of return. If increases in the breadth of li82 For a discussion of this trend, see William M. Landes and Richard
A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 413 (Belknap 2003) (arguing that intellectual
property rights will expand); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Political Economy
of
Intellectual Property Law 2-3 (AEI-Brookings 2004), online at http://www.aei.orglincludel
bookprint.asp?booklD=777 (visited July 16,2004) (using the "very crude measure"
of words in
federal statutes to show the rapid expansion of intellectual property rights since the
passage of
the 1976 Copyright Act).
83 Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of IntellectualProperty Law
at 412-13 (cited in
note 82).
84 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and
the Corporation,
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ability mean that investors are at risk for the contributory infringement of their investment vehicle, they may be less likely to invest.8
This is not necessarily a bad thing: investment is not desirable if it results in products not capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The
problem, however, is that investors may not know ex ante which investments will later turn out to be socially harmful.8
The protection of the corporate veil would do little to reduce the

risk of copyright liability for those who satisfy either indirect liability
test. Although traditional principles relating to the piercing of the corporate veil shield investors, a copyright holder would not need to
pierce the corporate veil to reach tertiary parties. Copyright infringement is a statutory violation itself, so liability attaches without piercing, even if piercing would not otherwise have been possible." Under
tertiary liability theory, therefore, an investor faces potentially limitless downside risk, while absent tertiary liability the investor risks only
what is invested." The further liability reaches, the more likely that
there will be wealthy investors who want to scrutinize their investments to avoid those that create liability. Therefore, the prospect of
copyright infringement liability will create the need for an extra layer
of monitoring-related transaction costs, which investors will have to
52 U Chi L Rev 89, 98 (1985) ("[Equity investors] are more secure and so demand a lower rate
of return under limited liability, but creditors demand a higher rate; the opposite is true under
Econ
unlimited liability."); I.N. Fischer and G.R. Hall, Risk and CorporateRates of Return, 83 Q J
event
forthcoming
a
of
outcome
the
predict
to
inability
the
as
defined
is
("Risk
79, 80 (1969)
with complete certainty. Entrepreneurs are viewed as making decisions in the face of uncertainty
on the basis of probabilistic expectations about future outcomes."). But see Peter Z. Grossman,
24
The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability:The Case of American Express,
unlimrata
pro
carried
stock
Express
American
while
that
(concluding
(1995)
63,78
J Legal Stud
ited liability, it was still not viewed by investors as "particularly risky"). Grossman, however,
return
notes the study has limits: "We should observe a significant risk premium attached to the
of the stock, and we should see a discount in the price relative to the market." Id.
Or they may demand a higher rate of return-but in practice a higher rate of return will
85
mean less investing.
to
86 This is especially true because the substantial noninfringing use test requires judges
imagine both potential noninfringing uses and the magnitude of these uses. See In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation,334 F3d 643,649-50 (7th Cir 2003) (noting that "when a supplier is offering
the rea product or service that has non-infringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of
See
infringement").
contributory
of
a
finding
for
necessary
is
uses
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of
spective magnitudes
also MGM Studios; Inc v Grokster,Ltd, 259 F Supp 2d 1029 (CD Cal 2003), affd, 380 F3d 1154
(9th Cir 2004) (holding that the Grokster computer program is, or would be, capable of substantial noninfringing uses).
where the
87 Conceptually, this is similar to United States v Bestfoods, 524 US 51,55 (1998),
Supreme Court found that a corporate parent could be liable for violating an environmental
be
statute as an "operator" -even under circumstances in which the corporate veil could not
relationpierced. In this sense, "aiding" is a Copyright Act violation in and of itself-the aiding
ship is sufficient for liability and does not require piercing.
See Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U Chi L Rev at 89-90 (cited in note 84) ("The rule of
88
limited liability means that the investors in the corporation are not liable for more than the
than just
amount they invest."). With tertiary liability, just as with piercing, more assets are at risk
those invested.
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bear. Some investments on the margin, which might have been socially
beneficial, will not be funded because of the additional transaction
costs and risk. However, this additional monitoring and preinvestment research may help deter secondary infringement.
Further, there is the general risk that tertiary liability puts the
burden of monitoring on the wrong party." If tertiary parties, by virtue
of the fact that they do not interact with direct infringers, are not in a
position to monitor cheaply, then the deterrent value of this liability is
low. Meanwhile, the costs, both monitoring and litigation, may be substantial. On balance, it is not obvious that we would be better off with
tertiary liability if the tertiary party is not able cheaply to detect and
deter infringement.
2. Inefficient behavior to avoid liability.
The possibility exists that monitoring costs may add little in terms
of deterrence but impose substantial costs-that is, they are not cost
justified. Tertiary parties are likely to include investors, suppliers of
technology, or other deep-pocket parties that may be wary of investing
if, in order to avoid the risk of liability, they are forced to choose between potential copyright liability or contractual absolution of any
oversight. This is not a question of risk aversion but of the effect of
imposing substantial monitoring costs to which parties will react in inefficient ways. For example, an investor who knows copyright law may
forgo a management role because any showing of involvement may in
turn show that there is control. Investors choosing between very passive roles or potential liability may not invest at all.
Corporate law tries to avoid this result. Limited liability serves to
decrease monitoring costs on the part of investors by insulating them,
thereby decreasing their incentive to monitor. Tertiary liability, on the
other hand, would increase incentives to monitor.9 Tertiary liability's
impact on investors, however, would remain localized: simple monetary investments without a right of control (or some other additional
act) are not enough to create liability for passive investors. To the
89 Some scholars arguing for unlimited liability for shareholders have posited that while "a
rule of joint unlimited liability would significantly increase shareholder incentives to monitor,"
this may not be an inefficient result. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum L Rev 1565, 1605-06 (1991). while the incentive to monitor may sometimes be
socially beneficial, the point still remains that a monitoring burden imposed in just one sector of
the economy would skew investors away from that otherwise attractive investment opportunity.
90 See Easterbrook and Fischel, 52 U Chi L Rev at 94 (cited in note 84):
All investors risk losing wealth because of the actions of agents. They could monitor these
agents more closely. The more risk they bear, the more they will monitor. But beyond a
point more monitoring is not worth the cost. Moreover, specialized risk bearing implies that
many investors will have diversified holdings.
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extent that active investing is desirable, however, this result is clearly
inefficient.
3. Delay, risk, and caution.
Increases in indirect liability may slow technological deployment
if companies must analyze how their products may implicate them as
indirect infringers. The test for secondary copyright infringement is a
standard, not a rule, and consequently it is more difficult for individuals to predict their liability." If the law expands to include another
layer of potential infringers, it becomes more difficult to predict one's
liability under the contributory copyright standard.
It is important here to avoid conflating two uncertainties. There is
one layer of uncertainty because standards, such as the substantial
noninfringing use test, have little predictive ability. This affects secondary and tertiary parties in different manners.
Under secondary liability, before an inventor rolls out a new program she will have to factor in the risk that the program will be found
not to be capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Under a regime of
tertiary liability, this same uncertainty is borne by tertiary parties as
well. This is arguably even more inefficient, however, because the tertiary party may not be in an ideal position to evaluate the product or
service in question. It will take greater resources for a tertiary investor
to evaluate the risk inherent before investing. Some of this uncertainty
could be resolved with a more predictable test for infringement. Absent such a test, the uncertainty inherent in copyright law will affect
tertiary parties to a greater extent than secondary parties. Even given
such a test, it will still be more difficult for tertiary parties to evaluate
their potential investments before committing.
4. Institutional competency.
Tertiary copyright liability, if extended by courts, would be based
on little legislative guidance. Meanwhile, the impact of tertiary liability
may be far-reaching, with potentially chilling effects on investment
throughout the economy, especially in high-technology, content-based
the ne-"
sectors. Perhaps courts are not the best institutions to evaluate
reaction to Netcom
Congress's
liability.
tertiary
of
limits
cessity and
shows the difficulty in managing the breadth of tertiary liability laws

91 See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557
(1992) (noting that individuals will find it easier to apply rules than standards because learning
rules requires learning the content of the rule, while standards require predicting the content
that a decisionmaker will later provide).
92 See Part II.A.2.
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and the desirability of nuanced, industry-textured rules-a task better
suited to legislatures than courts.
III. A PROPOSED SYSTEM OF TERTIARY LIABILITY
Tertiary liability has some desirable features but may also have
undesirable consequences. The tests for tertiary liability should therefore attempt to minimize the potential costs in terms of chilled investment, monitoring costs, delayed deployment of technology, and
risk. Ideally, however, the test will not exclude cases in which tertiary
liability will aid in cost-justified deterrence and compensation for
copyright holders. Any suggested test should be clear in demarcating
the boundaries of liability, to help tertiary parties avoid unnecessary
uncertainty.
In this Part, I attempt to clarify the tests that courts should use
when imposing liability on tertiary actors. Part III.A argues that the
case for tertiary liability, on balance, is stronger than that against it,
and therefore the doctrine should be explicitly adopted. Part III.B explains why courts will likely rely increasingly on theories of tertiary liability in response to changing technologies. Parts III.C and III.D
flesh out suggested tests for extending copyright liability to tertiary
parties and explain why they are efficient. Part III.C argues that for
contributory liability to extend to tertiary parties, courts should require knowledge of the direct act of infringement and an action that
furthers any type of infringement-direct or secondary. Part III.D
continues the analysis for vicarious liability, and argues that the most
efficient test would look to a direct financial interest in the directly infringing activity and control over any infringer.
A. Tertiary Liability Creates Efficiency Gains
Tertiary liability places a burden to monitor and prevent infringing activity on parties able to monitor and prevent infringement at the
lowest cost. Therefore, the doctrine should encourage cost-effective
deterrence and prevent a public goods problem, leading to efficient
and effective copyright enforcement. While the arguments against tertiary liability are forceful, the doctrine can be limited such that these
concerns are rendered relatively insignificant. " As discussed below
and in Part IV, it will be relatively easy for parties to reduce the risk of
tertiary liability, for example, through the use of declaratory judgment
proceedings. The tertiary liability tests themselves will ensure that parties for whom the extension of liability would lead to inefficient results are immune.

93

See Parts III.C-D.
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Tertiary Liability Will Be Necessary

The target of indirect copyright law, perhaps inevitably, has
changed dramatically over the years from fly-by-night phonograph
manufacturers to peer-to-peer software programs." Further changes in
technology may make indirect copyright liability generally, and tertiary liability specifically, attractive to copyright holders. These same
technological changes and developing technologies may force courts
to grapple with issues of appropriate deterrence and compensation."
For example, new technologies that mask the identity of direct infringers' may make recovery and deterrence against direct infringers
impossible, or at least extremely difficult and costly. In the arena of
digital copyright infringement, many users are judgment-proof, effectively limiting the ability of standard copyright law to deter their be-

havior." Further, many infringers will respond to the jurisdictional
limitations of U.S. courts by moving their infringing activity-or just
enough of their infringing activity to avoid liability -overseas. Faced
with new technologies and challenges posed by digital copyright infringement, courts and copyright holders may increasingly rely on indirect infringement actions to protect intellectual property.
The specter of judgment-proof direct infringers and jurisdictionally immune secondary infringers militates in favor of tertiary liability.
94 Historically, fly-by-night phonograph producers sold bootlegged albums at submarket
prices before disappearing with their ill-gotten gains. See, for example, Screen Gems-Columbia
Music, Inc v Mark-Fi Records, Inc, 256 F Supp 399,401 (SD NY 1966), noting that
[the defendants'] acts were typical of a practice which has plagued the music publishing industry and has posed a serious threat to the interests of music publishers, songwriters and
legitimate record companies-the unauthorized manufacture of phonograph records by flyby-night companies organized by unscrupulous individuals who, because of nonpayment of
royalties to the copyright owners, can sell the bootlegged product [for less].

95 See, for example, Jennifer Arend, Microsoft Accuses Arlington Man of Software Piracy,
Dallas Morning News 1A (Aug 2, 2000) (noting that fly-by-night operators selling illegal software on the internet are "a huge problem for Microsoft"). This problem exists in other contexts
as well. See, for example, John Pomfret, Chinese Pirates Rob 'Harry'of Magic,and Fees, Washington Post Al (Nov 1, 2002) (noting that fake Harry Potter novels showed up "in at least 10 cities
around China"). Particularly apposite here, see John Alderman, Freefor All, Guardian (London)
50 (Aug 4,2001) (stating that after the MP3 craze began, "[t]raffic on college networks swelled as
students began sharing every bit of music they could get their hands on" and that "[m]any amateur sites sprang up, fly-by-night gathering places for traders of copied songs"). See also Randal
C. Picker, From Edison to the BroadcastFlag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 281 (2003) (discussing changes in technology in response
to copyright infringement).
96 See Dominic Timms, Can the New Napster Cut It?, Guardian (London) 42 (Oct 20,2003)
(discussing peer-to-peer networks' attempt "to make tracking users' downloads more difficult").
97 See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 Cornell L Rev 901, 910-11
(2002) ("Even when the identity of infringers is uncovered, they often turn out to be judgmentproof teenagers or college students, who lack the means to pay damages. Thus, in many cases it
would be impossible to impose upon copyright-infringing Internet users the full optimal penalties dictated by deterrence considerations.").
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Even in other circumstances, however, tertiary liability will foster
more efficient monitoring, compensation, and deterrence by increasing the breadth of copyright infringement liability to include more
parties. Further, because those who "enable the enablers" are often
the lowest-cost avoiders of the direct infringement, tertiary liability
has the potential to prevent widespread direct infringement before its
incipiency.
C.

Contributory Liability: Knowledge and Act Requirements
Contributory liability can be analogized to aiding and abetting.
Those who help criminals should bear some of the costs the criminals'
actions create. By the same token, criminal law is concerned with excluding parties who are genuinely innocent. Contributory copyright liability that reaches tertiary parties should function similarly to aiding
and abetting: the knowledge test, described in Part III.C.1, should look
to knowledge of the direct infringement, thereby capturing only parties who know that their assistance will aid in infringement. The act
requirement, discussed in Part III.C.2, however, should be broader, allowing liability to attach to anyone who, with knowledge that her action would aid an act of direct infringement, helps any type of infringer. This test should exclude innocent parties who have neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the direct act but still include those
who knowingly enable an act of direct infringement, even if they do so
through a convoluted channel.
1. The knowledge requirement calls for knowledge of
direct infringement.
Contributory liability rests on the relationship between the contributory infringer and the infringing activity. Generally, the closer the
relationship between the contributory infringer and the direct infringement, the easier it will be to establish knowledge." Therefore, the
knowledge requirement is, and should be, directed at knowledge of
the direct infringement.
An easy analogy is to aiding-and-abetting law: if I give you a
baseball bat with the purpose of facilitating some violent act, I may be
liable for assisting you.9 However, if I had no knowledge that your in98
See Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 6.1 at 6:6 (cited in note 17) ("Where the defendant's activities are relatively close to the directly infringing acts, the plaintiff may meet the knowledge requirement by showing that, although the defendant lacked actual knowledge .... he knew of
facts that would have prompted a reasonable person to inquire into whether an infringement
was occurring."), citing Casella v Morris,820 F2d 362,365 (11th Cir 1987).
99 Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (ALl 1962) states that one is an accomplice if, "with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he ... aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it." Under the common law, providing
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tention was malicious, no liability will attach, even though the action
itself is identical. The idea is to attach liability only for bad faith actions. Knowledge of the direct infringement cleaves out cases in which
the tertiary party aids a secondary infringer in total innocence of the
secondary infringer's ultimate purpose. This, therefore, excludes parties whose behavior would not be affected by liability, but whose risk
would be.
Netcom demonstrates how this test would actually function. The
court found a genuine issue of material fact as to knowledge because
"Netcom ha[d] knowledge of [the direct infringer's] infringing postings yet continue[d] to aid."' The Netcom court concluded that
of the BBS's
knowledge of the direct infringement, not knowledge
'.
requirement.
proper
the
was
actions,
contributory
If the knowledge requirement is aimed at the direct infringement,
the test becomes a more substantial obstacle for pegging tertiary infringers. Knowledge of direct infringement is a proxy for how close
the indirect party is to the direct infringement. If courts simply look at
whether the tertiary party has constructive knowledge of the direct infringement, they will likely capture most cases in which the indirect infringer and the direct infringer are part of the same enterprise. Thus,
knowledge of the direct infringement, as adopted in Netcom, effectuates the purpose of the knowledge requirement and helps limit the
scope of tertiary liability.
In the copyright context, of course, the knowledge need not be
1
actual knowledge but may rather be constructive knowledge.'n This
may be a concern if courts assume the third-order infringer's knowledge. Often, there will not be a clear dichotomy between the tertiary
party's constructive knowledge of first- and second-order infringing
activities. For example, an investor in a company that makes software
allowing users to trade copyrighted music will likely have constructive
knowledge that distribution of the software is an act of contributory
infringement and that the software's use will be a direct infringement
of copyright law. The constructive knowledge requirement is useful
an instrumentality to commit an offense is sufficient. See Hensel v State, 604 P2d 222 (Alaska
1979) (holding that furnishing fuses for use in a burglary was sufficient for accomplice liability).
100 Netcom, 907 F Supp at 1375 (emphasis added).
101 Id at 1383 (denying an injunction because there was little evidence that Netcom knew of
the direct infringement).
102 See Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417,439 (1984) (stating
that liability for contributory infringement "must rest on the fact that [Sony] has sold equipment
with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material"). See also A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright
Infringement. The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 Notre Dame L Rev 47, 72 (1989) (noting
that the Sony knowledge requirement of "constructive knowledge of general infringement is
broader than the general tort theory under [Restatement (Second) of Torts] section 876(b),
which requires actual knowledge").
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because it disables "ostrich" defenses,' 3 ensuring that tertiary parties
cannot circumvent copyright law by refusing to acquire information
about the use of their products.'
2. The act requirement calls for an action that assists
any act of infringement.
To establish the second prong of the contributory liability test, it
should be sufficient for a copyright holder to show that a tertiary
party materially assisted any act of infringement. If the tertiary party's
action through another party aids or assists the direct infringer, then
the tertiary party is acting as part of the same enterprise (assuming,
again, that it has knowledge of the direct infringement).
The act requirement looks for an act that enables or assists the
direct infringer, but the enabling does not need to be direct. Realistically, the broader assistance test will mean that copyright holders can
get at those who allow an act of direct infringement to take place, but
who are artificially immunized from liability simply because their assistance was to a secondary rather than a direct infringer. Between the
knowledge and act requirements, the first directed at the direct infringement and the second directed more generally, the test is likely to
exclude situations in which benefits are oblique or where the action
was undertaken without knowledge of an infringement. A stricter test
looking for aid only to the direct infringer would exclude parties that
enable the direct infringer by helping a helper and therefore operate
in the same enterprise.
The Netcom court strove to avoid this result. The court, in assessing the ISP's liability, noted that Netcom may be liable if, with knowledge, it "continue[d] to aid in the accomplishment of [the direct infringer's] purpose of publicly distributing the postings."'. This differs
from the knowledge requirement, where the court looked for knowledge of the direct infringer's actions. Thus, a tertiary contributory infringer is liable if, with knowledge of the direct infringement, it aids or
assists any infringement.

103 See, for example, United States v Inglese, 282 F3d 528, 537 (7th Cir 2002) (stating that
"la]n ostrich instruction informs the jury that actual knowledge and the deliberate avoidance of
knowledge are the same thing").
104 Nevertheless, broadly imputed knowledge may extend liability too widely. Thus, if
courts begin extending liability to tertiary parties, they should do so using the knowledge test
reservedly.
105 Netcom, 907 F Supp at 1375 (emphasis added).
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D. Vicarious Liability: Financial Interest and Control Requirements
Vicarious liability exists in copyright law to keep one party from
benefiting from the infringing acts of another party. In extending vicarious liability to tertiary parties, the legal test should stay true to this
basic theme. As Part III.D.1 shows, the financial interest requirement
should look for a benefit from the direct infringement. The control requirement is broader, as argued in Part III.D.2, and focuses on control
over any infringer.
1. Vicarious liability requires a financial interest in the
direct infringement.
The House Report for the 1976 Copyright Act states that "[t]o be
held a related or vicarious infringer in the case of performing rights, a
defendant must ... expect commercial gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from the infringingperformance."'° Be-

cause courts will assume a "commercial gain from the operation"
when there is a benefit from the infringing performance, in effect, the
only thing that matters is whether there is a direct or indirect benefit.
If the infringing activity creates additional value for another party,
that party has the requisite financial interest.'7
The financial interest requirement originally focused on the nature of the financial structure, determining whether there was an increase in income due to infringements. Shapiro,Bernstein & Co v H.L.

Green Co,l° the case which articulated the requirements for vicarious
liability, found an "obvious and direct financial interest" based on the
fact that the defendant department store took a fraction of the gross
receipts from a bootlegged record seller.n' Similarly, the dance hall
cases demonstrate that businesses may be vicariously liable for copyright infringement committed by performing bands because performances of infringing works draw more patrons."O Courts contrast the
106 1976 Copyright Act, HR Rep No 94-1476,94th Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN
5775-76 (emphasis added).
107 The specific financial arrangement is not as important as the effect of the arrangement.
See Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 6.2.2 at 6:22 (cited in note 17) (noting that practical, not strictly legal, ability to control governs). Therefore, a dance hall owner may not be liable if the financial
arrangement does not allow for a payment of a percentage of gross ticket sales. See, for example,
Freemontv Aeolian Co,254 F 592, 593 (SD NY 1918) (finding no liability where the defendant
received no profits from performances other than hall rental fees).
108 316 F2d 304 (2d Cir 1963). As with Gershwin for contributory infringement, Shapiro is
the seminal case for vicarious infringement. See, for example, Sony, 464 US at 437-38 n 18.
109 Shapiro,316 F2d at 307.
110 See, for example, Famous Music Corp v Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Association,Inc, 554 F2d 1213,1215 (1st Cir 1977) (finding that proprietors of public establishments
operated for profit cannot disclaim liability by simply claiming ignorance); KECA Music, Inc v
Dingus McGee's Co, 432 F Supp 72,75 (WD Mo 1977) (stating that actual knowledge is not nec-
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dance hall cases against their foil: the landlord-tenant cases. Generally,

infringing activities engaged in by a tenant will not create liability for
a landlord simply by virtue of this relationship, because the landlord
does not earn more money when the tenant infringes-that is, they are
not part of the same economic enterprise."'
The financial interest requirement, however, has broadened over
time. In Fonovisa,Inc v Cherry Auction, Inc,"2 the Ninth Circuit found
a financial interest where the defendant operated a flea market at

which infringing recordings were sold. ' Other courts have used an
even more liberal test to find liability."'

As a practical matter, therefore, the structure of the financial interest requirement obviates the need to distinguish between primary
and secondary infringers. The requirement is broad, even allowing a
hope of future profits to serve as a financial incentive. Thus, whenever
a secondary infringer stands to benefit from an infringement, the tertiary party will as well because the benefits are inextricably intertwined. The route through which the tertiary party benefits is more
convoluted, but the enterprise functions to pass profits along to another party."' The breadth of the requirement means that a tertiary infringer will satisfy the financial interest requirement whenever there is
a benefit from the direct infringement-even if this benefit is gained
through a secondary infringer.

As discussed above, one reason for vicarious copyright liability is
to internalize the costs of unlawful activities. From a policy perspective, therefore, it makes sense for courts to hold tertiary parties liable

when they are part of the same infringing enterprise. The broad financial interest test accomplishes this end.

essary for liability); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc v Shapiro, Bernstein & Co, 36 F2d 354, 355 (7th
Cir 1929) (finding that a dance hall owner was liable because music was played for the profit of
the hall owner).
Ill Of course this is not entirely true. A policy of noninterference in a tenant's activities may
create some financial benefit for the landlord, but it will be limited and not directly tied to the infringing activity. See Netcom, 907 F Supp at 1376-77 (discussing an argument for this attenuated
form of financial interest).
112 76 F3d 259 (9th Cir 1996).
113 Id at 263-64 (noting that "the sale of pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction swap
meet is a 'draw' for customers, as was the performance of pirated music in the dance hall cases
and their progeny").
114 See, for example, A&M Record-S Inc v Napster, Inc, 114 F Supp 2d 896, 921 (ND Cal
2000) (holding that a future hope to "monetize" may suffice to establish a financial interest).
115 This may be why courts seem less reluctant to hold majority shareholders liable for the
infringing activities of their closely held corporations. See Rodgers v Quests Inc,213 USPQ 212,
214 (ND Ohio 1981) (enjoining a radio station from playing copyrighted "musical compositions"
without consent); Boz Scaggs Music v KND Corp, 491 F Supp 908, 913 (D Conn 1980) (finding
KND corporation liable on twenty-three causes of action); Famous Music Corp v Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Association,Inc, 423 F Supp 341, 344-45 (D Mass 1976) (enjoining defendant corporation from playing unlicensed material), affd, 554 F2d 1213 (1st Cir 1977).
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When liability extends on the basis of financial interest, however,
investment may decrease.16 Nevertheless, the control requirement helps
eliminate situations where there is a financial interest but no real ability to control the infringing behavior. This protects certain types of passive investors and decreases monitoring costs. This test, therefore, would
encourage only active investors to monitor their investments.
2. The control requirement looks for control over any infringer.
There are two approaches to control as a requirement for vicarious infringement: legal right of control and actual right of control. "7
Generally, a contractual right to supervise may not itself be sufficient
to support liability,"8 but if that right to supervise is exercised, the control requirement may be satisfied."' Situations where there is meaningful control, even if only contractual, are those where the parties are
acting as one enterprise. Similarly, the enterprise liability concepts inherent in vicarious liability' attach liability to parties that are part of
the same economic enterprise, such as dance hall operators, but not
landlords."'

See Part II.C.1.
117 For further discussion, see Charles S. Wright, Actual versus Legal Control: Reading VicariousLiability for CopyrightInfringement into the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct of 1998,75
Wash L Rev 1005, 1012-20 (2000) (discussing the benefits and detriments of each approach and
analyzing state law).
118 See, for example, Bevan v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 329 F Supp 601, 610 (SD NY
1971) (noting that "since neither access nor participation was established in respect to the two
sponsors, they may not be cast in damages unless they had at least the 'power to supervise and
control the content of the infringing program').
119 See, for example, Davis v Dupont de Nemours & Co, 240 F Supp 612,632 (SD NY 1965)
(noting that "Dupont was not merely an advertiser buying time on a program produced by a station over whom it had no control"). So a landlord may have a legal right of control, but because
this right is never exercised, the landlord would not have actual control over an infringing tenant.
However, if the landlord typically entered the tenant's rental unit to check for infringement, a
court might find that the landlord exercised sufficient control to garner liability.
120 See, for example, Polygram InternationalPublishing,Inc v Nevada/TIG, Inc, 855 F Supp
1314, 1325 (D Mass 1994) ("When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in which identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily fair and reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the person who profits.").
121 This may in part explain why vicarious copyright liability extends to shareholders. See,
for example, United States Media Corp v Edde Entertainment Corp, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 10985,
*23 (SD NY) (stating that "[a] corporate officer or principal shareholder may be held responsible for the corporation's copyright infringement" as either a contributory or vicarious infringer);
Greaver v NationalAssociation of Corporate Directors, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 21816, *14 n 11
(D DC) (stating that "company officials and shareholders can be held liable for copyright infringement if they are in a position to police the 'primary infringer' and had a direct financial interest") (internal citations omitted); Jobete Music Co v Media Broadcasting Corp, 713 F Supp
174, 178 (MD NC 1988) (noting that "cases have also determined that shareholders may be held
jointly and severally liable for copyright infringement under the right and ability/interest test")
(internal citations omitted).
116
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Copyright law tries to prevent both direct and indirect acts of infringement. Vicarious liability furthers this goal by forcing parties to
monitor and internalize costs. Therefore, it seems consistent with
copyright law's goals that we would want tertiary parties, to the extent
that they are part of the same operation as secondary parties, to internalize the costs of the secondary infringing as well. If the tertiary party
has control and a financial interest, it is very likely that it is part of the
same enterprise, and extending liability will encourage cost internalization for both direct and secondary infringing acts. 2
Thus, control over any infringer, coupled with a financial interest,
is the proper test for effectuating the goals of vicarious liability for
tertiary infringers. These two requirements in tandem seem likely to
restrict liability to those whose behavior the law should impact-those
who benefit from the infringing and who can do something about it.
IV. THE POST-TERTIARY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY WORLD
What will the world look like if tertiary liability is endorsed regularly by courts? First, of course, the affected parties will react to the
legal rule. As discussed in Part IV.A, it is likely that a declaratory
judgment will be required before venture capitalists extend capital.
Alternatively, it may be that peer-to-peer networks will continue to
exist, but on a smaller scale because they cannot obtain from tertiary
parties the support necessary for growth. Part IV.B argues that Congress may respond to tertiary liability, perhaps by limiting the remedies available for use against tertiary parties, similar to the approach
taken in trademark law.
A.

Responses by Secondary and Tertiary Parties

If venture capitalists, inventors, and others recognize the risk of
tertiary liability, they will likely require that those seeking capital obtain a declaratory judgment stating that their product does not infringe. For example, Hummer Winblad might have conditioned its investment on Napster receiving a declaratory judgment that its service
was not infringing (or more likely, that it satisfied the substantial noninfringing use test).'" This would be an ideal response from an efficiency point of view: it limits infringing uses as a condition to greater
growth. This limits investment to those products that are not harmful,
and consequently creates an incentive to design and develop products

122 See Polygram International,855 F Supp at 1325 ("[P]lacing responsibility for the loss on
the enterprise has the added benefit of creating a greater incentive for the enterprise to police its
operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses.").
123 See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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that are noninfringing (since only these will receive capital investments later).
On the other hand, it may be that the risk of liability will keep
tertiary parties out of the game entirely. The result would be secondary infringement on a smaller scale, as investors and inventors may
not assist the secondary parties. Paradoxically, this may actually make
it harder to stop secondary infringers: additional smaller networks
with no assistance from tertiary parties means that secondary infringement will be costly and difficult to squelch.
B.

Response from Congress

One important conceptual difference between tertiary and secondary copyright liability is remedies. Copyright holders pursuing secondary parties, such as Napster or other facilitators, will often seek injunctive relief. Meanwhile, these copyright holders will often turn to
tertiary parties for compensatory purposes.) Of course, nothing prevents the copyright holder from seeking compensation against secondary infringers, or seeking injunctive relief against tertiary parties, but
the converses seem more likely. For example, in the context of Napster
and widespread infringement enabled by cash-poor start-up companies, tertiary parties are more likely to have deep pockets, and are
therefore more likely to be pursued for compensatory damages.
That said, many of the concerns with respect to tertiary liability
are founded on the risk of imposition of crushing damage awards. This
seems less worrisome if, as noted in Part IV.A, potential secondary infringers seek declaratory judgments in advance. Even so, if Congress
were to restrict courts to injunctive relief against tertiary parties, this
legislative intervention would mitigate the risk even further. This
would be especially appropriate if Congress is concerned about overdeterring "good faith" tertiary parties. Because such a response would
lessen the monetary penalties for infringing, however, some of the
benefits of tertiary liability, such as increased deterrence and compensation, would be lessened. Ultimately, this might be a reasonable balance to strike; but again, because of the competing interests and difficult policy issues implicated, it is perhaps best resolved by Congress.
If injunctive relief alone were available, however, it might still be
profitable for tertiary infringers to invest in secondary infringers. For
example, an inventor might license his technology to another party,
knowing that that party would engage in contributory infringement.
This might still be profitable because with only injunctive relief the inventor would be - at worst - in the same position as before. There is
124

text.

Or at least that has been the prevalent pattern thus far. See notes 1-4 and accompanying
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no incentive not to license the technology because the law provides no
downside. Thus, if Congress were to limit the remedies for tertiary liability to injunctive relief, it should also include a damage provision
for intentional -that

is, bad faith-tertiary infringement, similar to

provisions adopted in other intellectual property statutes.'
CONCLUSION

Liability for copyright infringement extends to tertiary parties
under existing law. As long as the test for infringement does not cast
too wide or uncertain a net, tertiary liability encourages efficient
monitoring and deterrence. A contributory liability test that looks for
knowledge of direct infringement and assistance to any infringer, and
a vicarious liability test that looks for a financial interest in the direct
infringement and control over any infringer, are supported by current
case law for tertiary as well as secondary liability. These tests have inherent limiting principles that keep liability from extending beyond
situations where extension would be socially beneficial. On net, therefore, tertiary liability would encourage cost-effective deterrence and
monitoring, which would lower overall infringing activity.

125 This would be analogous to the remedies available under the Lanham Act for dilution of
a famous trademark. See 15 USC § 1125(c)(2) (2000) ("[Tlhe owner of the famous mark shall be
entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title unless the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause
dilution of the famous mark.").
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